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1“‘Butskelism’ is the, moderately satirical, term used in British politics to refer to the political
consensus formed in the 1950s and associated with the exercise of oﬃce as Chancellor of the
Exchequer by Rab Butler and Hugh Gaitskell.4
... The consensus dominated British politics until 1979 when the administration of Margaret
Thatcher radically challenged accepted wisdom and institutionalized a greater emphasis on a
free market approach to government.”5
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Few propositions in political theory combine the simplicity and appeal of Anthony Downs’ (1957) conver-
gence to the median conclusion for two-party/candidate electoral competition in one dimension.6 Downs
modeled parties or representatives that are purely motivated by the attainment of oﬃce, an assumption
that allowed him (and the electorate) to equate post-election representative behavior to the fulﬁllment of a
pre-election promise or platform. Given a pair of platforms in Downs’ world, the one closer to the median
emerges victorious. Hence, the only equilibrium can arise at a pair of platforms set at the ideal policy of
the median.
The ‘convergence to the median’ conclusion has left scores of graduate students gratiﬁed on the
discipline’s level of intellectual attainment and generations of undergraduates leaving lecture rooms de-
termined to communicate the exciting new insight to the outside world. Of course, many of these same
students (and perhaps the reader) contemplated the pursuit of elective oﬃce and, on the same time, held
ideal public policies quite likely diﬀerent from those of the ‘median.’ If we admit that, no matter how
strong the ambition for oﬃce, representatives also have genuine policy preferences, then the idyllic world
of Downsian politics is disturbed.
To boot, in the one-period model of Downs, a representative or party has no incentive to deliver
on pre-election platform promises once elected in oﬃce. This problem can be overcome in a model with a
suﬃcient future horizon, assuming voters can maintain their focus and punish parties or candidates for not
delivering on election promises. But in such models a lot of policy paths, not just repetitions of the median
4Author’s clariﬁcation: of the pre-1951 Labour and post 1951 Conservative governments, respectively. Butskelism from
Butler and Gaitskell.
5Source: Wikipedia, The free Encyclopeida, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Butskelism.
6For a recent review of this literature to date, see Duggan, 2004.
2policy, obtain. For example, Duggan and Fey, 2004, demonstrate complete indeterminacy of equilibrium
outcomes in a repeated elections setting, in fact assuming Downsian candidates/parties. Furthermore,
historically, numerous parties/candidates that implemented policies quite distant from the median have
moved on to win (consecutive) elections. Examples include the Conservative Margaret Thatcher’s record-
setting streak in the premiership of the UK, or George Bush’s re-election to the US presidency in 2004.
Such examples can be attributed to electoral noise or ‘probabilistic voting,’ a reasonable assumption
about the often capricious nature of elections. If we combine policy motivated candidates with probabilistic
voting, we get equilibrium policies that are away from the median (Wittman, 1983).7 For that reason,
Wittman’s result has been welcomed by a number of scholars. It produces (possibly mild) policy diﬀerences
among competing parties, so that ‘politics matters’ in equilibrium. Furthermore, it rationalizes data that
seem to suggest that policies by competing parties/candidates are not identical.
Yet, important questions remain unanswered. On the theoretical front, Wittman assumes common
knowledge of candidate preferences and maintains pre-election platforms that are delivered with disturbing
precision. In reality, the true policy preferences of representatives are private information. Thus, both
platform declarations or even past policies may be strategic choices to please or deceive the electorate
regarding the party’s/candidate’s true intentions. Furthermore, both models produce trivial electoral
dynamics in that they display levels of convergence or divergence that are constant over time.
Empirical observation suggests otherwise, as the introductory quotation illustrates. Indeed, Down-
sian convergence seems to be a fair approximation of the world of British politics in the 50’s and 60’s. But,
by the late 70’s and 80’s, few can credibly make that claim. Importantly, the Downsian approximation is
inaccurate both in terms of delivered policies, but also in spirit. For the most part, Margaret Thatcher’s
Conservatives made no eﬀort to conceal their ideology, or pretend that their intentions were diﬀerent than
the actual policies of the time. Even when opponents attempted to appear more moderate, they were
unsuccessful. In particular, in consecutive elections the Labour party attempted to present an ideologically
reformed, more moderate facade, but these attempts (at least ex post) seem to have been discounted by
the electorate which became convinced of the reform only recently. Today, after two decades of perceived
and actual divergence, British politics seem to be once more close to the Downsian ideal.
Our goal in this paper is to develop a model of two-party competition that can account for this pattern
7Roemer 1999, 2000 proposes a model of party competition in multiple issue dimensions that is premised on the idea that
disagreement within parties generates party competition equilibria when none of the parties can unanimously improve on
their own platform given the platform of the opposition.
3of dynamics in which protracted phases of divergent and convergent politics succeed one another. Unlike
Downs or Wittman, we assume pre-election commitments are impossible and dispense with pre-election
policy announcements. Instead, we assume that parties’ true policy preferences are private information that
is (possibly) revealed to the electorate through policy consequential choices while in government. Thus,
our study is related to recent developments in electoral models of incomplete information such as those by
Banks and Sundaram, 1993, 1998, Duggan, 2000, and Banks and Duggan, 2002.8
We diﬀer from the above studies in that we do not assume that the incumbent in each period faces
a challenger drawn from a common distribution. The assumption of an opponent drawn from a stationary
distribution seems appropriate for individual candidacies, if we think of new challengers drawn from a
common or identical pool of possible candidates. But such an assumption is particularly problematic when
considering competition between political parties. This is because parties are collective organizations,
and all organizations display inertia. As a result, if the electorate obtains new information about the
prevalent ideological preferences of a party by observing its policy while this party is in government, then
this information is likely to weigh on the voter’s assessment about the ideological preferences of that party
in future periods. We formalize this idea by assuming that following electoral defeat parties undergo an
internal change that stochastically determines new partisan preferences, and that these new preferences
are positively serially correlated.
In the model, the two parties and a median voter interact an inﬁnity of periods. Aside from their
policy preferences, parties also care about getting control of government. The voter’s payoﬀ depends on
implemented policy following the election. Parties are more farsighted than the voter in that their payoﬀ
depends on the electoral and policy outcomes of two successive periods.
In each period the voter chooses one of the two parties, and may condition her choice on the rationally
updated equilibrium beliefs about the extremism of the two parties, as well as on the policy implemented
by the incumbent party prior to the election. Political parties/types condition their choice of policy while
in government on the perception of the electorate about the extremism of the two competing parties.
We study symmetric semi-Markov Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria. We show that if parties are
impatient or place signiﬁcant emphasis on oﬃce vs. policy, the only equilibrium involves party types
implementing their ideal policy independent of the electorate’s beliefs about the two parties. We also
8Other models of incomlete information focus on the fact that the incumbent’s action while in oﬃce is unobserved (hidden
action). Such models include Ferejohn, 1986, Rogoﬀ and Sibert, 1988, Rogoﬀ, 1990, and Meirowitz, 2003. Banks and
Sundaram, 1993, combine aspects of both models.
4show that there does not exist a robust equilibrium in which the opposite holds and all parties implement
moderate policies independent of beliefs. Thus, our setup does not sustain Downs’ convergence to the
median conclusion, no matter how strong parties’ preference for oﬃce.
In the case when parties assign high weight on oﬃce utility vs policy, they moderate their policy
choice when perceived less extreme compared to the opposition, and pursue extreme policies with positive
probability when the opposite is true. Extreme policies occur in equilibrium when (a) both parties are per-
ceived to be relatively extreme, and (b) neither party holds a signiﬁcant advantage regarding its perceived
extremism by the electorate. Equilibrium dynamics produce two qualitatively diﬀerent adjustment paths.
Either there is positive probability of extreme policies in the future for a protracted period of time, when
beliefs about the two parties’ extremism are above their long term steady state; or there is zero proba-
bility of future extreme policies in the opposite case. Thus, two-party parliamentary systems may display
(relative) extremism or moderation in protracted periods. In the long-run parties’ perceived extremism
converges to levels that guarantee moderate policies with probability one.
Our presentation proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the model in detail and deﬁne the
equilibrium concept used in our analysis. This analysis takes place in sections 3 and 4. Section 4 contains
the main results of the paper concerning equilibrium in which parties value oﬃce more than policy. We
characterize an equilibrium (proposition 3), discuss equilibrium properties (proposition 4), and equilibrium
dynamics (proposition 5). In section 5 we extend our analysis to the case of probabilistic voting. We
conclude in section 6.
2M o d e l
The game is played between the electorate represented by a moderate or median voter, M,a n das e to f
partisan ‘types’ within each of two political parties. These players interact an inﬁnity of periods t =1 ,2,....
We denote a generic party by P, which is either a left-wing party (P = L), or a right-wing party, (P = R).
Each of the two parties contains individuals with two diﬀerent ideological convictions, call them moderates
and extremists. These two groups/types disagree as to the optimal government policy. In each period one
of the two groups holds the prevailing ideological position of the party. Thus, in period t party P ∈ {L,R}




5We assume that the type of the party varies over time because of the stochastic outcome of some
internal battle between the groups of moderates and extremists for positions of inﬂuence within the party
(MP candidacies, local and national party organization positions, union representation, lack of competent
leadership of a group of faction despite arithmetic prevalence, etc.). Because of inertia in the manner in
which partisan populations evolve, or due to the fact that the prevailing ideological group in the party
commands resources and/or other institutional advantages, we assume that the prevailing type within the
party is better positioned to ﬁght the internal battle for control of the party in the next period. Thus, the
type of the party is positively serially correlated (inequality (2) below). Furthermore, for similar reasons
having to do with the control of resources used to inﬂuence within-party political battles, the prevalent
partisan type is better able to maintain control of the party when elected in government rather than when
in opposition (inequality (1) below).
Formally, we assume that partisan types τt
P follow a Markov chain the transition probabilities of
which depend on whether the party is in government or not. Speciﬁcally, if the party’s type is τ ∈ {e,m}
in period t, it is of the same type in period t +1 , with probability πg
τ or πo
τ depending on whether the
party is in government or in the opposition, respectively. In general, we assume
πg
τ > πo
τ, τ ∈ {e,m}.( 1 )
We also assume that
πo
e > 1 − πo
m (2)
so that the probability of an extreme party type is higher if the party’s type in the previous period is
extreme. Finally, since (with the important exception of the discussion in subsection 5.2 ***to be added)
our arguments do not depend on the exact values of πg
τ,w es e tπg
e = πg
m =1in order to simplify the
algebra.
Parties know the realization of their own type in each period, but that information is not revealed to
other players except via policy consequential choices of the party/type while in government. Players hold
(and rationally update) beliefs about the probability that each party is moderate or extreme. In particular,
at each stage in the game there is a pair of probabilities b =( bL,b R) ∈ B,w h e r eB ≡ [0,1]
2,t h a tr e p r e s e n t
the common beliefs of the voter about the two parties and of the parties for each other. Thus, probability
bL represents the belief of M, (and party R)t h a tp a r t yL is extreme. Similarly, bR is the corresponding
belief that party R is of type e.
6The voter and parties interact as follows. In each period, the voter elects one of the two parties
to control the government. Following the election, nature chooses the type of the party according to
the transition probabilities in (1). Then the party/type in government chooses and implements a policy
xt ∈ X. In general, there are four possible policies in each period, a left-wing policy, xL
e ,am o d e r a t e
left-wing policy, xL
m, and corresponding right-wing policies xR
e and xR
m. As will become evident by our
assumptions on players’ payoﬀs, we do not preclude the possibility that xL
m = xR
m is a common policy. This
permits a ‘convergence to the median’ equilibrium to occur. But we allow xL
m 6= xR
m, i.e. there may exist










When it comes to the choice of government policies, we assume (naturally) that moderate types
always implement the moderate policy xP
m.9 The strategic burden in the model is born by the extreme
partisan types. In particular, type τt
P = e may choose either xP
e or xP
m. The policy choice by the governing
party is observed by all players and the game moves to the next period. In that period, the voter elects a
new government, new partisan types are realized, the governing party implements a policy, etc.
Preferences Since moderate partisan types always pursue the same action,10 we only need state
payoﬀs for the voter and the two extreme partisan types (left and right). The preferences of these players


























e , i.e. the voter prefers moderate policies and parties are symmetrically





e , P ∈ {L,R}. The above preferences coincide with the intuitive interpretation of the diﬀerent types:
extremists of each party prefer the respective partisan policy most, moderate policies next, and they least
9Indeed, this is the behavior that would arise endogenously in an equilibrium of the type we characterize.
10In particular, this would be an optimal behavior in equilibirum for these types, even if they were allowed to choose among
policies.





τ , τ ∈ {e,m}. A graphic rendition of admissible conﬁgurations of policies in the classical
one-dimensional spatial model is given in ﬁgure 1.
[insert ﬁgure 1 about here]
While the voter only cares about the policy outcome, parties also prefer to control the government
independent of the policy that the government pursues. In particular, partisan types receive utility G ≥ 0
when their party (i.e. independent of prevailing party type) is in government. We assume that the voter is
strategic but cares only about the policy outcome in the current period. Partisan types are (potentially)
more farsighted and care about the electoral and policy outcome in two periods, the current period t as well
as period t +1 . We parameterize the weight parties place in the outcome of the next period by assuming
they discount that period’s payoﬀ by a factor δ ∈ [0,1].
Strategies We shall focus our attention on Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria in strategies that are
appropriately Markovian, i.e. strategies that depend only on a summary of the history of the game in
each period. Given the structure of the model, the payoﬀ relevant strategic environment for the players is
summarized by the commonly known beliefs about the probability that extremists prevail within the two
parties, b ∈ B. Thus, a strategy for type e of party P is given by a function:
σP : B −→ [0,1], P ∈ {L,R}.( 3 )
Accordingly, σP (b) is the probability that type e of party P implements policy xP
e .
In principle, we could similarly restrict the voter, M, to pursue a Markovian strategy that depends
only on beliefs b ∈ B. Instead, we allow the voter’s strategy to also depend on the policy choice of the
party in government in the period prior to the election.11 This allows us to build a retrospective element
on voter’s strategies, even though the voter is still prospective and strategic. Furthermore, this type of
history dependence is necessary for existence of equilibrium. Thus, a voter strategy is given by a function














∈ (0,1) means the voter randomizes accordingly.
11This is in addition to the indirect eﬀect that these policies have on the voter’s beliefs. In other words, the voter may
choose a diﬀerent voting action following two diﬀerent policies, even if these two policies lead to the same posterior beliefs.
8Evolution of Beliefs Players apply Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs (bL,b R) ∈ B regarding
partisan types. Speciﬁcally, if party P implements an extreme policy, it reveals its type and the updated
belief about the probability the party is extreme is given by:
β
e (bP)=1 , P ∈ {L,R}.( 5 )
When observing a moderate policy, updated beliefs depend on the equilibrium probability with which party
P chooses such a policy. If the probability of choosing an extreme policy is given by σ, then updated beliefs





, P ∈ {L,R}.( 6 )
Note that β
m (0,b P)=bP, i.e. beliefs remain unchanged if the party chooses an extreme policy with
probability σ =0 . Similarly, we have β
m (1,b P)=0if σ =1 .12 No information is obtained for the party
that is in opposition so that beliefs about this party remain unchanged.
Finally, according to our assumptions regarding the evolution of party types following elections,
beliefs about party P that loses an election are given by
β
o (bP)=πo
ebP +( 1− πo
m)(1− bP), P ∈ {L,R} (7)
Due to our assumption that πg
e = πg




ebP +( 1− πg
m)(1− bP)=bP, P ∈ {L,R} (8)
[insert ﬁgure 2 about here]
In our discussion of equilibrium dynamics, we will use the long-term steady state of the Markov chain
induced by the internal re-structuring in the party following an electoral defeat. This long-term probability









o (bo)=bo.13 It is straightforward to verify using (2) that
bP > β
o (bP) >b o ⇐⇒ bP >b o (10)
12Even when bP =1 .
13An analogous (unique) expression can be derived for the chain deﬁned by the transition probabilities π
g




9i.e. a party with a perceived extremism above (below) the long-term steady state is moving monotonically
toward that steady state from either direction. In ﬁgure 2 we depict the evolution of beliefs about the two
parties following an election in which either party wins (loses) the election. Note that the direction and
magnitude of change in beliefs diﬀers with the direction and distance of beliefs at the time of the election
from the long-term steady state bo.
Expected payoﬀs Given strategies Φ, σP, P ∈ {L,R}, we may now derive expressions for players’
expected payoﬀs. In particular, the expected utility of the voter M from choosing party P when beliefs






















m if P = R
(11)
Notice that (11) reﬂects the fact that, following an election, the losing party undergoes an internal shake
up as determined by (7).
Likewise, the expected payoﬀ of type e of party L from implementing a moderate policy is given by:
UL
m (b)=uL














































. On the other hand, by implementing an extreme policy the party expects:
UL
e (b)=uL





































The corresponding expressions for party R are obtained in an analogous fashion.
Equilibrium Concept With the above we can state the deﬁnition of our equilibrium concept as
follows:




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
=1 if V L (b) >VR (b)
∈ [0,1] if V L (b)=V R (b)
=0 if V L (b) <VR (b)




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
=1 if UP
e (b) >U P
m (b)




e (b) <U P
m (b)
,f o ra l lb ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R}. (15)
Note that this equilibrium is semi-Markov Perfect Bayesian Nash.14 It shies away from being Markov
Perfect Bayesian Nash because we allow the voter to condition her strategy on the policy that prevailed in
the last period. This is a relatively mild deviation from Markovian strategies.
The history dependence of voting strategies allows us to incorporate a retrospective element on
voting behavior. In particular, we say that a voting strategy is retrospective if the voter does not re-elect a
party that pursued an extreme policy in the last period. Accordingly, we deﬁne a retrospective equilibrium.









1 if P = R
0 if P = L
, for all b ∈ B. (16)
Since parties only care about one future period, a retrospective voting strategy gives parties a
strong incentive to pursue moderate policies. Thus, equilibria in which parties pursue extreme policies are
signiﬁcantly more credible when they are retrospective equilibria. We emphasize that we do not assume
retrospective voting as a “hard-wired” behavioral trait of the electorate, i.e. voter’s strategy must still
satisfy equilibrium condition (14) when retrospective. In other words, retrospective voting constitutes a
best response if present in a retrospective equilibrium.
Our equilibrium deﬁnition leaves room for a further reﬁnement on voting strategies. To motivate
this reﬁnement, note that when indiﬀerent between the two parties the voter is allowed to randomize in
an arbitrary fashion in choosing between these parties. This is not controversial in our symmetric setup if
the beliefs about the two parties are identical. But if the beliefs about the two parties diverge, it seems
intuitive that the voter may weakly favor the party that is perceived to be more moderate. This becomes
14Technically, it is a reﬁned Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium because in the outset we resolve the question of possible
out of equilibrium beliefs by setting βe (bP)=1and βm (1,1) = 0.
11obvious if parties pursue pure strategies. In that case, the indiﬀerence of the voter is not robust to the
possibility of a (small) exogenous probability ε > 0 that extreme types may ‘tremble’ and choose a policy
diﬀerent than the one intended. Thus we deﬁne a robust equilibrium as follows:





such that for each ε, ε > ε > 0,t h e




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
1 − ε if σP∗ (b) > 1 − ε
ε if σP∗ (b) < ε
σP∗ (b) otherwise
A few remarks are in order concerning robust equilibria. First, there exists an obvious connection
between our requirement and standard reﬁnement arguments dating to Selten’s trembling hand perfect
notion. It is important to emphasize that the concepts are also diﬀerent. In particular, we consider one
among a (very) large range of possible perturbations of partisan strategies. Furthermore, we do not consider
the consequences of such perturbations on the optimality or robustness of parties’ strategies, even though
that is an obvious avenue to pursue. Our goal with a robust equilibrium is more limited in that we simply
seek to resolve the electorate’s indiﬀerence in a manner that is responsive to its beliefs about the relative
extremism of the two parties.
There is a more direct (and apparently more restrictive) manner to impose such a reﬁnement. In
particular, it seems intuitive in our setup to conjecture that parties are weakly preferred by the voter when
they are perceived to be less extreme than the opposition. Thus, if we require this intuitive property and
resolve indiﬀerence in favor of the least extreme party, we may deﬁne an intuitive equilibrium as follows:





1 if bL <b R
0 if bL >b R
(17)
for all x ∈ X.
Note that intuitive equilibrium implies retrospective equilibrium behavior whenever beliefs about
the opposition are given by b−P < 1 (because the posterior belief following an extreme policy is given
by β
e (bP)=1>b −P), but condition (16) is not implied by condition (17). Thus, we will refer to an
equilibrium as an intuitive retrospective equilibrium if the voter’s strategy satisﬁes both (16) and (17).
12A second remark is that, in eﬀect, condition (17) renders the surviving equilibria closer to genuine
Markov Perfect equilibria. In particular, the voter is limited to (possibly) condition her action on past policy
choices only in a set of payoﬀ relevant states b ∈ B such that bL = bR. Thus, an intuitive equilibrium
involves voting strategies that are Markovian, except for a set of payoﬀ relevant states b ∈ B of measure
zero.
In the next two sections we proceed to an analysis of the game. First we consider the analogues
of ‘pooling’ and ‘separating’ equilibria in our dynamic game. In such equilibria, extreme partisan types
pursue the same ‘pure’ action independent of the state b ∈ B, hence we call these equilibria simple. Our
main results appear in section 4, where we consider robust retrospective equilibria that are not simple and
involve parties that place high weight in oﬃce (high G) and in the future (high δ).
3 Simple Equilibria
Naturally, the primary focus of our analysis is in the dynamics induced by the strategic calculus of extreme
partisan types when they contemplate the trade-oﬀ between a (preferable) extreme policy in the current
period and the possible utility loss in the next period due to averse electoral consequences. In particular,
we are interested in the range of the state space (the set of beliefs held by the electorate) in which the
extreme partisan types pursue extreme policies or try to emulate moderate types (or not), and the policy
dynamics these strategies generate.
Before we move to this more interesting analysis, we consider two simple types of equilibria in
which parties’ strategy does not depend on the state of beliefs b ∈ B. First, in proposition 1, we give
a precise range of parameters in which extreme partisan types implement extreme policies whenever in
power, independent of beliefs b ∈ B.W eh a v e :










This equilibrium is intuitive. Furthermore, when the inequality is strict, in all equilibria σP (b)=1 ,f o ra l l
b ∈ B.
Proof. See the Appendix.
13Note that (except for the case of equality) when condition (18) holds all equilibria of the game
involve extreme partisan types pursuing their ideal policy. Thus retrospective voting is not suﬃcient to
induce moderation when either (a) parties are impatient (low δ), or (b) parties place low value to oﬃce (low
G), or (c) the loss in utility due to the policies pursued by the opposition party controlling the government
is small (low uP
e − aP
e ).
One may conjecture that when these conditions are reversed we may instead obtain a simple ‘pooling’
equilibrium in which extreme partisan types always pursue a moderate policy. It is possible to construct
such equilibria (for high enough G & δ) exploiting voters’ indiﬀerence, but these equilibria are not robust.
Indeed we can show that there does not exist a robust retrospective ‘pooling’ equilibrium:
Proposition 2 There does not exist a robust retrospective equilibrium such that σP (b)=0 ,f o ra l lb ∈
B, P ∈ {L,R}.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus the analogue to a ‘convergence to the median’ result is not attainable in our game in a robust
equilibrium, despite retrospective voting. The reasoning behind proposition 2 is straightforward. If all
party types moderate policies independent of the electorate’s beliefs, then the electorate is indiﬀerent
between the two parties. In a robust equilibrium, the voters then will elect that between the two parties
that is perceived to be more moderate. Thus, a party that is in government, is controlled by extremists,
and is perceived to be more extreme than the opposition, has no incentive to pursue a moderate policy.
This party faces electoral defeat independent of policy choice, so types in control of the party might as well
pursue their ideal policy.
Thus, in combination propositions 1 and 2 imply that when condition (18) fails, a robust retrospective
equilibrium must involve some positive probability of moderate policies pursued by extreme types who
anticipate a future electoral gain from doing so, as well as some positive probability of extreme policies
pursued by these types. We take the analysis of such more interesting equilibria in the next section.
4 Equilibrium with Oﬃce Motivated Parties
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the strategic calculus of parties is trivial when partisans are primarily
motivated by policy. Such parties/types simply pursue their ideal policy. Thus, the interesting strategic
environment is one in which parties value oﬃce signiﬁcantly compared to policy and are patient. Three
14questions emerge in such an environment: (a) Does there exist a robust retrospective equilibrium in which
extreme party types pursue extreme policies for some beliefs? (b) Are extreme policies observed along the
equilibrium path?, and (c) What are the policy and electoral dynamics that prevail? In what follows, we
answer question (a), (b), and (c) in subsections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 respectively.
4.1 Robust Equilibrium
Our goal in this section is to establish a robust retrospective equilibrium when condition (18) fails, and
parties are suﬃciently patient and motivated predominantly by oﬃce considerations (high G). Proposition










There exists a unique intuitive retrospective equilibrium with





bL (1 − bR)
if bL >b R
0 otherwise
(20)
This equilibrium is robust.
Proof. See the Appendix




τ , P ∈ {L,R}, τ ∈ {e,m}. Furthermore, the equilibrium in proposition 3 holds for arbitrarily
large values of G, as long as parties place some weight in the future (δ > 0). Thus, no matter how oﬃce
oriented parties are, there exists a conﬁguration of beliefs by the electorate about the extremism of the
two parties that makes it worthwhile for extreme partisan types to pursue extreme policies. This occurs
when the party is disadvantaged electorally. Figure 3(a) displays the equilibrium probability of an extreme
policy choice by extreme partisans of party L, σL (b).
[insert ﬁgure 3 about here]
From the perspective of the electorate, the expected probability that, say, party L will pursue an
extreme policy given beliefs b ∈ B,i sg i v e nb ybLσL (b).I n ﬁgure 3(b) we plot this probability. In
both cases of ﬁgure 3(a) and 3(b) it is straightforward to verify via calculus or visual inspection that
15the probability of an extreme policy increases when the party is perceived to be more extreme than it’s
opposition.
To see why party L mixes when bL >b R, observe that the party loses the election if it pursues a
moderate policy with probability one. This is because in that case (if σL (b) was set to zero), the policy of
the government conveys no information to the electorate and other players in the game. Thus, following a
moderate policy it is still the case that posterior beliefs satisfy bL >b R, and party L still loses the election.
Thus, pursuing a moderate policy with probability one is not an equilibrium.
What if the party implements an extreme policy with probability one (σL (b)=1 )? Then, since the
electorate expects party types to ‘separate’ the party has an incentive to deviate and implement a moderate
policy instead. This would convince the voter that the party is moderate, when in fact it is extreme. Thus,
the only possibility for an equilibrium is a mixed strategy, where the mixture probability is such that it
makes the party barely competitive against its opponent when the realization of the party’s randomization
is a moderate policy.
Finally, when the party has an electoral advantage, it has no incentive to spoil its electoral prospects
by implementing an extreme policy. In particular, the party wins the election whenever it sets a moderate
policy. Thus, given that partisan types care suﬃciently about oﬃce, the only equilibrium choice is to set
σL (b)=0 , i.e. chooses a moderate policy with probability one.
4.2 Extreme Policies Along the Equilibrium Path
The fact that extreme partisan types pursue their ideal policy with positive probability (σP (b) > 0)f o r
some beliefs b ∈ B in proposition 3 is not suﬃcient to produce extreme policies along the equilibrium
path. This is because these types pursue extreme policies only when the opposition party is perceived
more moderate. But, parties that are perceived less moderate are not elected in government in the ﬁrst
place. In other words, along the equilibrium path, the probability that an extreme policy is observed is
regulated via appropriate screening from the electorate.
Do we obtain extreme policies along the equilibrium path despite this screening by the electorate?
The answer is in the aﬃrmative and our analysis provides a precise mechanism for this to occur. Extreme
policies are observed in equilibrium following elections in which: (a) both parties are perceived to be
extreme (above their long-term level of extremism), and (b) the election is ‘close’. Speciﬁcally, the set of
beliefs at the election stage from which extreme policies are expected with positive probability is deﬁned
16as follows:
e B ≡ {b ∈ B : bL > β
o (bR),b R > β
o (bL)} (21)
It is straightforward to verify that b ∈ e B implies both bL,b R >b o.
The reason why extreme policies occur in this area of the space of possible beliefs involves a ‘regres-
sion to the mean’ eﬀect. Parties that are perceived relatively more extreme and barely lose the election to
the opposition undergo internal changes, or reforms following their electoral defeat with higher probability
(assumption (1)). Because these parties’ perceived extremism is above their long-term equilibrium level,
this internal shake up moves the party towards moderation closer to its long term perceived extremism
(by condition (10)). As a result, a government that comes to power with a bare advantage, is perceived
more extreme than the opposition immediately following the election. In these cases the government may
pursue extreme policies. The area in which this is possible is depicted graphically in ﬁgure 4 for diﬀerent
values of the transition probabilities πo
e and πo
m.
[insert ﬁgure 4 about here]
We summarize our discussion of the equilibrium in the following proposition:15
Proposition 4 The equilibrium in proposition 3 is such that:
(a) The (expected) probability that party L implements an extreme policy weakly increases with bL,
and weakly decreases with bR,
(b) The expected probability of an extreme policy following an election with beliefs b ∈ B,i sw e a k l y
increasing with bL when bL <b R, and is weakly decreasing with bL when bL >b R. It is positive if and only
if b ∈ e B.
We conclude our analysis in this section by considering the dynamics of beliefs and policies induced
by the equilibrium in proposition 3.
4.3 Equilibrium Dynamics
Starting from any belief level b ∈ B, beliefs evolve over time via Bayes’ rule following government’s policy,
and via the electorate’s anticipation of internal restructuring within parties that lose the election. It is
15The proof of this and the following proposition are straightforward and are omitted.
17straightforward to verify that equilibrium beliefs remain unchanged if for some reason the system rests
at belief points (bL,b o) ∈ B with bL ≤ bo and party L is in government16. In these cases the party
in government is pursuing a moderate policy with probability one, and there are no changes in beliefs
regarding the opposition because the opposition is already at its long-run level of beliefs.
Indeed, the equilibrium in proposition 3 is such that with probability one the political system is
absorbed at one of these belief points, without any forces inducing a change in beliefs after that. At all
these possible absorbing points, there is probability zero of an extreme policy. Both the eventual absorbing
belief point and the path that leads to that point diﬀer qualitatively depending on initial conditions. We
summarize these dynamics in proposition 5:
Proposition 5 The equilibrium in proposition 3 is such that when initial beliefs are (bL,b R) ∈ B and party
L is in government:
(a) If bL ≤ bR and bL ≤ bo the system is absorbed at (bL,b o) ∈ B with probability one and there is
zero probability of an extreme policy along the path of play,
(b) If bL >b R and bR ≤ bo the system is absorbed at (bR,b o) ∈ B with probability p =
¡








or at (bo,b R) with probability 1 − p; there is probability σL (bL,b R) of an extreme policy in the ﬁrst period,
and zero in the subsequent path of play, and
(c) If bL,b R >b o the system is absorbed at (bo,b o) ∈ B with probability one; for any point along the
path of play, there is positive probability of an extreme policy in future periods and set e B is visited inﬁnitely
often.
The dynamics described in proposition 5 are illustrated graphically in ﬁgure 5. Cases (a) and (b)
are very similar in that following the ﬁrst election in these cases, the party that is elected in government
is guaranteed to be perceived more moderate than the opposition. As a result, the government always
implements a moderate policy and is re-elected with probability one. This process continues until players’
beliefs about the extremism of the opposition party reach the long-run steady state bo given in (9).
[insert ﬁgure 5 about here]
The situation is much diﬀerent when both parties are perceived to be above their long-term steady
state level of extremism, bo. In these cases, we have one of two possibilities. Either the party in government
16Or, symmetrically if (bo,b R) ∈ B with bR ≤ bo and party R in government.
18is perceived to be more extreme than the opposition in which case it implements an extreme policy with
positive probability; or, the party is favored electorally and pursues a moderate policy. In the latter case,
the governing party wins re-election until internal adjustments in the opposition ‘turn the tide,’ and the
opposition is perceived more moderate than the government. Since both beliefs bL,b R exceed the long-
term steady state level of perceived extremism bo, such a situation will arise ‘inﬁnitely often’ along the
equilibrium path due to condition (10).17 As a consequence, if the system starts from a situation in which
both parties are perceived to be relatively extreme, extreme policies will occur in the future with strictly
positive probability for every point along the path of adjustment to the long term absorbing state (bo,b o) ∈ B.
Importantly, the path to the long-run steady state may be quite long when bL,b R >b o, depending
on the values of πo
τ, τ ∈ {e,m}. Thus, even though in the long run the political system converges to a
situation consistent with the predictions of Downsian competition, equilibrium adjustment dynamics may
contain a signiﬁcant number of electoral cycles away from that long-term steady state and with a positive
expectation of extremism.
4.3.1 The i.i.d. Case
As we already mentioned, the exact speed of adjustment in beliefs is regulated by the values of the tran-
sition probabilities, πo
τ. In a special case, the adjustment process is instantaneous. This occurs when the
probability that a party is extreme following an internal shake-up is independent of the previous identity
of the prevailing group in the party. Formally, this amounts to assuming bo = πo
e =1− πo
m.T h i sc a s ei s
interesting because it corresponds to the assumption in existing electoral models with incomplete informa-
tion (e.g. Banks and Sundaram, 1993, or Banks and Duggan, 2002). In these models, extremism is not
serially correlated over time, and equilibrium is stationary along the equilibrium path. Thus, we do not
observe paths of play with the qualitatively diﬀerent dynamics described in proposition 5.
5 Probabilistic Elections
The model in the previous section constitutes a clean, baseline environment from which to evaluate the
consequences of introducing more complicated assumptions. In this section we consider one such extension,
namely the possibility of probabilistic elections.
17Of course, the probability of an extreme policy dissipates as beliefs approach the absorbing point (bo,b o).
19Even for the most tranquil political environments it is reasonable to assume that events out of
the control of the players may inﬂuence the outcome of the electoral campaign and give a critical electoral
advantage to one of the two parties contesting for power. Such exogenous events can be both favorable to the
government (e.g. a victorious war or success in foreign policy) or the opposition, (e.g. scandal involving the
government, etc.). They may simply represent a temporary swing on the electorate’s ideological convictions.
To incorporate this possibility, we assume that in each election period there is an (exogenous)






















that the incumbent government is re-elected or ousted, independent of the voter’s strategy. This amounts
to assuming that the voter’s strategy is now given by:
Φ : X ×B−→ [w,1 − w]. (23)
with the obvious modiﬁcations on conditions (16) and (17).18
Of course, with this assumption a party that is perceived more extreme is no longer guaranteed
defeat in elections. This has two main implications for our analysis. First, substantively we obtain behavior
and outcomes that are closer to empirical observation. Just like Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives won
consecutive elections, in our analysis there is positive probability that a party may remain in government
and implement an extreme policy in successive periods.
The second implication of our assumption on probabilistic voting has to do with equilibrium dy-
namics. In particular, it is straightforward to derive the following extension of propositions 3 and 5:19
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m − aL




(a) There exists a unique intuitive retrospective equilibrium with partisan strategies given by (20).
This equilibrium is robust.
(b) The expected probability of an extreme policy following an election with beliefs b ∈ B, is positive
for both parties if and only if b ∈ e B,
18A slightly more complicated assumption in the same spirit is to assume w is an appropriate function of the electorate’s
beliefs b ∈ B. This can be implemented in the analysis to follow, without any gain in insight.
19The proof is available upon request.
20(c) For initial beliefs b ∈ Be = {b ∈ B : bL,b R >b o} there is probability one that future beliefs
remain in Be,a n d e B is visited inﬁnitely often prior to election,
(d) For initial beliefs b ∈ Bm = {b ∈ B : bL >b o ≥ bR or bL ≤ bo <b R} there is probability one that
future beliefs remain in Bm and Bm ∩ e B = ∅,
(e) Starting from any b ∈ B, the system is absorbed at (bo,b o) ∈ B with probability one.
Condition (24) is analogous to condition (19), adjusting for the probabilistic nature of elections.
Because of the restriction on w in (22), there exists discount factor δ < 1 that satisﬁes this condition.
Furthermore, for any such discount factor, condition (24) is satisﬁed no matter how large G is, i.e. no
matter how oﬃce oriented parties are.
Qualitatively, the equilibrium in proposition 6 is very similar to that in proposition 3. In particular,
partisan strategies are identical, and equilibrium dynamics display similar properties. When belief about
the extremity of at least one of the two parties is less than or equal to bo, then extreme policies are observed
only when contrary to the systematic20 preference of the median voter (with probability w) a relatively
moderate party loses the election. Furthermore, along the path of adjustment at least one of the two parties
is always perceived to be extreme with probability less than bo.
On the contrary, if beliefs about the extremity of both parties exceed the long-term level bo there is
probability of extreme policies by both contestants in the election along the path of adjustment. In other
words, for beliefs that are visited inﬁnitely often along the equilibrium path there are elections in which the
winner implements extreme policies with positive probability, whether the winner is the relatively moderate
party or not. Thus, in that sense it is still the case that the path of adjustment for initial beliefs b ∈ Be
produces more policy polarization than is the case when b ∈ Bm.
Finally, unlike the equilibrium in proposition 3, with probabilistic voting the absorbing set does not
depend on initial conditions. Beliefs are eventually absorbed at (bo,b o) ∈ B from any initial level b ∈ B.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have analyzed electoral and policy dynamics in a two party parliamentary system of government. While
the model we speciﬁed is in many regards coarse, it delivers a rich set of insights on the nature of two-party
20i.e. when exogenous shocks in preferences such as scandals, foreign policy developments, etc. alter the median’s ranking
between the two contesting parties.
21competition and the induced dynamics. On the same time, our setup leaves a number of open avenues for
improvement. First, the equilibrium we characterize when parties are primarily oﬃce motivated involves a
long run steady state level of beliefs about the two parties that is absorbing and involves moderate policies
with probability one. This conclusion is qualiﬁed if we introduce additional noise in the system in one of
two forms: (a) diﬀerent transition probabilities for the type of the parties while they are in government,
or (b) random (exogenous) shocks on the electorate’s beliefs in any given period.
By way of generalization, we have made heavy use of symmetry and it is worth exploring equilibria
in asymmetric settings. Unfortunately, the stumbling block in this case is the lack of analytical solutions,
which is a very appealing feature of the current setup. Another more promising avenue for generalization
concerns the extension of our current analysis to the case of more than two types and possible policies
available to each of the two parties.
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248 APPENDIX
In this appendix we state the proofs of propositions 1 to 3.






e we must have σP (b)=1for all
b ∈ B in all equilibria. Suppose, to get a contradiction, that there exists an equilibrium with σP (b) < 1
for some b ∈ B. Then we must have UP
m (b) ≥ UP
e (b) for these beliefs. Note that logically (independent
of strategies) expected utilities must satisfy UP
e (b) ≥ uP
e + G + δaP
e and UP
m (b) ≤ uP






for all b ∈ B. Thus, using these bounds, we deduce from UP
m (b) ≥ UP















e ,ac o n t r a d i c t i o n .
Next, we verify that σP (b)=1for all b ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R} is part of a robust retrospective equilibrium
when (18) holds. From the above arguments, σP (b)=1for all b ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R} are (at least weak)






e . As a result, we only need specify
a voting strategy that constitutes a robust,retrospective best response. For perturbed party strategies
σP
ε (b)=1− ε we calculate voter’s expected utility as
V P












1 if bL <b R












=1 ,s ot h a tΦ is also retrospective. We complete the speciﬁ-
















, b ∈ (0,1). We have established that σP (b)=1for all b ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R},i sp a r to far o b u s t ,
retrospective, and intuitive equilibrium.
Lastly, we show that σP (b)=1for all b ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R} are not part of a robust retrospective






e . Without loss of generality assume party L is in government. In every




1 if bL <b R












=1 .Given posterior beliefs β
m (1,b L)=0and β
e (bL)=1 ,w ec a l c u l a t e
(except possibly for the case of beliefs bR = bL) expected utility when parties use the prescribed strategies
UL
e (b)=uL












25while a one-period deviation by extremists of party L to a moderate policy accrues
UL
m (b)=uL






w h e r ew eh a v es u b s t i t u t e df o rΦ(x,·,·), in (12) and (13). Now, comparing the two expected utilities we
obtain
UL
e (b) ≥ UL















> 0,t h e r ee x i s t sb bR ∈ (0,1) such that UL
e (b) <U L
m (b) when bR > b bR. As a consequence,
σP (b)=1 , for all b ∈ B cannot be a robust retrospective equilibrium when (18) is violated.
We continue with the proof of proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. If σP (b)=0 , for all b ∈ B, P ∈ {L,R}, the voting strategy Φ(x,b)
must satisfy condition (17) in a robust equilibrium since voter’s expected utility calculated with perturbed
strategies σP
ε (b) must satisfy bL >b R =⇒ V L
ε (b) <VR
ε (b),f o re v e r yε > 0. Recall that posterior beliefs
following moderate policies satisfy β
m (0,b P)=bP.T h u s ,f o rb ∈ B such that, say, bL >b R and party L is





=0in a robust equilibrium. In a retrospective equilibrium





=0 . Thus, substituting in the expected utility expressions (12) and (13) we get
UL
m (b)=uL
m + G + δaL
m <U L
e (b)=uL
e + G + δaL
m
Thus, σL (b)=0is not optimal for party L and equilibrium condition (15) is violated.
Lastly we prove proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3. We shall prove the proposition using a few lemmas. We ﬁrst show that
in a robust equilibrium with the stated party strategies, voting strategy must be intuitive.
Lemma 1 In a robust equilibrium with party strategies given by (20), the voting strategy satisﬁes condition
(17).
Proof. Without loss of generality assume bL <b R, and consider small ε ≥ 0 (ε < 1
2). We execute a








This inequality is necessarily strict only when ε > 0 (because it is possible that σL
ε (β
g (bL),β




o (bR)) is weakly decreasing in its second argument and bL <b R =⇒ β
o (bL) < β
o (bR)











o (bR)) is weakly increasing in its ﬁrst argument and β
g (bR) > β
g (bL)

















ε (b) ≥ V R
ε (b)
where V L
ε (b), V R
ε (b) are voter’s expected utilities from electing the left and right parties respectively
given strategies σP
ε (b). Thus, since the original inequality is strict when ε > 0 we deduce that the only
robust equilibrium must involve intuitive voting strategies that satisfy condition (17).
Next, we show that given intuitive retrospective voting strategy, the only equilibrium party strategies
are given by (20).
Lemma 2 Assume (19) and a voting strategy that satisﬁes (17). In every retrospective equilibrium, party
strategies are given by (20).
Proof. Again without loss of generality we consider the strategy of the left party. For b ∈ B with
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=1from (17). So, the expected




























































































But the latter is condition (19), so we conclude that UL
m (b) >U L
e (b) and σL (bL,b R)=0is the unique
optimal strategy when (17) holds and bL <b R.
Next consider the case bL ≥ bR. Again, by choosing an extreme policy, party L expects
Ue (b)=uL












We can verify that for any probability σ of choosing an extreme policy by party L, beliefs following a
moderate policy xL




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
>b R if σ < σL (bL,b R)
= bR if σ = σL (bL,b R)
<b R if σ > σL (bL,b R)
i.e. σL (bL,b R) is the (unique) mixing probability the induces the updated belief pair (bR,b R) ∈ B when L
chooses xL














































m (σ,b L). Now, due to (17), we verify with straightforward algebraic manipulation that if
(19) holds we get
UL






=0 ), and (28)
UL







28As a consequence, equilibrium can only be attained when σ = σL (b), in which case (because of the strict











To summarize we have shown that the only retrospective equilibrium with intuitive voting involves
party strategies given by (20). Furthermore, the only robust voting strategy when party strategies are





∈ (0,1) is uniquely determined for b ∈ [0,1]. Thus, there exists a
unique intuitive retrospective equilibrium that is also robust.





are available upon request.
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Key: The ideal policy of moderate partisans may be identical (the median) in one 
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              (a) Probability of extreme policy by extreme partisan of party L. 
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                 (b) Electorate’s expected probability of extreme policy by party L.  
 
Key: Contour plots of probability of an extreme policy in the space of beliefs, B = [0,1]
2. 
Lighter areas indicate higher probability. Probability is zero in black areas.Figure 4: Equilibrium Expected Probability of Extreme Policy Prior to Election 
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Key: Contour plots of expected probability of an extreme policy prior to the election in 
the space of beliefs, B = [0,1]
2.  Lighter areas indicate higher probability. Probability is 
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Key:                  change in beliefs following defeat of the Left 
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